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Summary  findings
At what  speed should state firms be restructured?  One  They find that when the probability of closure is small
challenge in transition economies has been to avoid being  (as at the outset of transition), unemployment will peak
caught between the Scylla of overrapid restructuring  at a lower level than when the probability of closure is
(which hurts the private sector) and the Charybdis of  high - but  the speed of transition will be much slower.
gradual change (signals from which can undermine the  They find that widespread tax avoidance in the private
emergence of a robust private sector).  sector can stimulate that sector's growth and result in a
Empirical evidence suggests that in most of Eastern  speedier transition. What this means is that while a low
Europe and the former Soviet Union, insiders, by  tax burden on the private sector can drive
exerting control over decisionmaking, have materially  unemployment up rapidly by increasing the probability
affected the rate of restructuring. Still, in Central and  of closure in the state sector, it can also help speed up
Eastern Europe, shocks to firms have generally led to  the transition by provoking a more rapid private sector
sharp rises in unemployment. Unemployment benefits  response.
were initially generous and, combined with lost payroll  Commander  and Tolstopiatenko  show that while the
taxes, substantially increased fiscal costs.  speed of restructuring in the state sector is sensitive to
In the former Soviet Union, both restructuring and  the tax burden, which in turn depends on unemployment
unemployment have remained limited and subsidies to  and the ability to tax the private sector, it is also true that
firms remained high. The private sector expanded, but  the private sector's growth depends on the tax burden it
chiefly in the gray (untaxed) part of the economy.  faces. In particular, they show that capturing the private
Commander  and Tolstopiatenko  examine the  sector in the tax net early in the transition can lead to its
implications of various speeds of restructuring, explicitly  collapse and hence to the failure of restructuring.
introducing probabilities of closure and of restructuring.
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I1. Introduction
At what speed to restructure state firms has been a key issue in the transition economies.
One  of  the  challenges  has  been  to  avoid  being  caught  between  the  Scylla  of  too  rapid
restructuring with  its  associated  negative impact on the private  sector, and  the Charybdis  of
gradual change and its associated policy signals that could also undermine the emergence of a
robust private sector. Country experiences point to significant diversity in restructuring rates and
private sector expansion but also indicate that restructuring has tended to move in phases and has
been powerfully affected by the  fiscal  and political  economy  effects  that it has  itself  set  in
motion.
One regularity  that  emerges  from  the  empirical  evidence  is  insider privatisation  has
largely dominated through most of Eastern Europe and the FSU. An important implcation of this
is that  insiders  have  exerted  important control over  decision-making  and  this  has materially
affected the rate of restructuing.  Even with such insider control dominant, the scale of shocks to
firms has generally led in East and Central Europe to sharp rises in unemployment. For those
made  unemployment,  benefits  were  initially  reasonably  generous  and  this,  combined  with
foregone payroll taxes, resulted in substantial fiscal costs. In the FSU, the adjustment has been
rather different. Restructuring has been limited and unemployment has generally also remained
small.  Instead of  outlays  on unemployment  benefits,  labour hoarding  and  firm-based  social
protection has continued to require subsidies to firms. While there has been significant expansion
of the de novo private sector, it has been largely in the grey or untaxed part of the economy.
This paper builds on the insights provided by a series of two sector models of transition,
particularly Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and Chadha and Coricelli (1994), and attempts to look
more closely at the factors likely determining restructuring decisions in a two sector world of
state and private firms. Our main focus is on the inmpact  on the restructuring choice and hence, in
effect, on the restructuring decision from within the firm. In particular, we introduce exogenous
probabilities  of  closure  and  restructuring  for  the  state  sector and  look  at  the  sensitivity  of
restructuring to  those probabilities.  Given the prevalence  of insider privatisation this  seems a
reasonable  limitation.  We  also  attempt  to  look  more  closely  at  the  fiscal  implications  of
restructuring, primarily by looking at the implications of differential tax burdens on thc two core
sectors of these economy. For example, while the speed of restructurino in the state sector will  besensitive to the tax burden, which in turn will depend on unemployment and the ability to tax the
private sector, we can also think of the private sector's  growth as depending critically on the tax
burden that it faces. In particular, we show that capturing the private sector early in the transition
in the tax net can also lead to its collapse and hence to the failure of the restructuring process.
2. Points of departure
The economy consists of two sectors -- state and private -- and three labour market states,
state  employment,  private  employment  and  unemployment.  The  labour  force  is  given  by;
Ns  + NP + U _ N,  + N2 + U = 1.  At the  start  of transition,  all employment  is  in  the  state
sector;  N2= U =O; there is no  private  employment and  no unemployment.  But  faced with
large, negative shocks, state firms have had to make an initial cut in employment. Therefore, we
can assume that at the start of transition;
N,=No  <1,  N2 =No  >0,  U=U 0=1-N'  -No>  0.
2.1 State firms
Initially the economy is dominated by state firms whose constraint is that of  zero profits.
This  is because insiders  have power  and can extract all surplus in the firm.  With no capital
accumulation, we can write the state firm's problem as;
{Ni-  Ni v
subjectto;  w1N, =p,Y,
Wages in the state sector are set equal to average product; w, = AP, or, incorporating taxes per
worker;  w,=AP,-tl.
State firms  can continue to  operate  with  this  wage  setting rule but  in  each period  a certain
proportion of these fir  ms will fail.  This is given exogenously and is an attempt to capture the
fact that  state firns  cannot survive indefinitely  without investment and this  must  necessarily
force insiders to  think  about restructuring  or privatization.  If the  insiders  do  restructure  or
privatize, this will lead immediately to a decline in employment, an increase in marginal product
for remaining workers and a change in wage setting, with wages now set as in the private sector.
3The initial value of being in state employment can then be written as;
rV=  w  + PU(V-  Vl) + P 2 (V 2 - Vl) + V  (1) Value ofbeing  inthe  state sector
where;  PIu  = P + PR (-y)  - the  complete  probability  of moving  from  the  state  sector to
unemployment and P2  = PRY - the probability of moving from the state to the private sector.
In effect, we consider two channels through which workers can become unemployed. The first
channel is through the closure of the state firm with probability p,  where p is the probability of
the state firm closing or failing.  Clearly, the higher is p,  the smaller the value of being in the
state  sector relative  to  unemployment  is  likely  to  be.  The  second  channel  is  through  the
restructuring process itself, after which a proportion of workers (1-y) becomes unemployed. This
proportion has to be multiplied by the probability of restructuring to get the unconditional joint
probability of becoming unemployed through this channel.
Note  that the second channel moves workers not only to unemployment but also to the
private  sector, as  a proportion,  (y), of  workers remains  in  the restructured  firm.  We further
assume that the value of a restructured firm,  VR  is the same as the value of a private firm, V2.
The balance equation for state sector employment which incorporates all outflows from the state
sector is given by;
'V,  = -(PI.  + PION,
2.2 Private sector
We assume that the private sector pays efficiency wages and firms are constrained by
their labour demand curves.
The value of being in the private sector is;
(2)  rV2 =  w2 +  P(V.  - V2) +  V2
where ,B  is the probability of losing work.
For job creation, the key issue is the rate at which a new job is created;
H(U)/U=ac  (MP2 -w 2-t 2)/U
where MP2=marginal product; w2= wage; t2= taxes per worker in the private sector.
2The  probability  of closure  of the state firn can be written  as p=p(I-pPR)  and includes  both the probability  of not
restructuring  (l-pR) and  the probability  of closure  of the unrestructured  firm,  p°.
4Private  wages  depend  on the outside  labour  market so that;
w 2 = b+c(r+  +  +H /U)
where c  is  a  constant (mark-up value), r  =  interest rate and  H/L  is the  exit rate from
unemployment.
2.3 Unemployment
The value of being unemployed  is given  by;
rV,  = b + (HI  U)(V 2 - V")  + V.  (3) Value of being unemployed
where b = unemployment  benefits  and H/U = the hiring rate from unemployment.  As in Aghion
and Blanchard  (1994), when unemployed,  workers  receive unemployment  benefits,  b, with the
probability  H/U of leaving  unemployment  for work. When employed  again the worker receives
the private sector wage. In other words, we assume  that workers can only lose their  jobs in the
state sector and can only find new work in the private sector  or be unemployed.
Initially, in  response to  product market  shocks and  institutional disruption, state
employment at  impact  drops  to  No  and  1  - No  workers  become unemployed.  As
restructuring/privatization  continues, this  creates  an  additional flow  into  unemployment
proportional  to (J-y). The flow into unemployment  depends  on the speed of restructuring  which
will in part depend on the parameter p -- the exogenous rate of failure of state firms -- and the
flow out is equal to private  job creation,  H.
Accordingly,  unemployment  follows;
dU/dt=(p+PR(l-y))N1  -H(U)+PN 2
3. The restructuring  choice
We now turn explicitly  to the restructuring  choice facing  insiders  in state firms. Here we
can think of workers  weighing  up the respective  values of staying employed  in the state sector,
subject to the probability,  p, that the firm will close and they will become  unemployed  with its
associated  exit probability.  Restructuring  implies job losses and ultimately a shift in the wage
setting rule to that holding in the private sector. With restructuring,  as already indicated, a
proportion  (1- y ) of workers  will become  unemployed.
5Taking the risk neutral case and workers  facing equal probabilities  of staying employed,
restructuring  will only proceed  when;
(4)  VR>  VI  or  yVR+(1-y)VU >VI or
YV2+(1-Y)VU2 VI,I
where we consider  the restructured  firm  to have  the same value for a worker  after  restructuring  as
a private firm. This implicitly  assumes that those that stay in the firm are better off than being
unemployed.  Alternatively,  if there is no severance  mechanism,  the condition  would become;
(5)  VU  > VR
those that lose their  jobs should  be no worse off as a result of restructuring.
We proceed with assumption  (4). We can now get the values of being in several states,
assuming  this costless  adjustment.  The value to the worker  of being in a state firm that does not
restructure  (PR  = 0) is;
rV, =AP, -t,  +p(V  -VI)+Y
The initial question to ask is what will determine the decision to restructure ? The
restructuring  condition  is;
VR =(1-PR)Vl  +PRY V2  + PR (-y)VU  > VI  (6)
which  is equivalent  to;
YV2  +(1-Y)VU  ŽVI
given  an a posteriori  probability  of restructuring,  PR=  1. From the equation  for V]
rV, = wI + P,u (Vu - VI) + PI2  (V 2 - VI) + VI  (1) Value of being  in the state sector
where
PIU  = P+PR(1  Y)
P12  PRY
it follows  that,
y V2  +(1-Y)VU  >V,  = W11/  + PIUV.+  p12V2
r+plu  +P12
Substituting  expressions  for probabilities  into this equation  we get
(r+p)(y  V 2 +(I-y)Vu)2w,  +pV,,  =  r(y V 2 +(l-y)Vu)+-yp(V 2 -Vu)>w,
6We can see from this equation that restructuring will take place if the probability of closure, p,
exceeds some critical value. We term this critical value, Pc;
w, -r(y  V2+(l-y)Vu)  _wl -rV,  _r
7 (V,-  Vu)  7yc
Substituting the value of unemployment into this equation and assuming the markup value, c,  for
the private wage as constant, we finally get;
wI,-b- _U  7 rc
PC =
7 c
Therefore the lower is the hiring rate, the larger must be the probability of closure to
make workers choose to restructure. We can see from this condition that if the state wage is close
to  unemployment  benefits,  b,  then pc  <  0.  In  this  case workers  will  have  an  incentive  to
restructure (p > Pc) for any value of the hiring rate.
3.1 Severance
To this point we have assumed that it is possible to separate workers costlessly. Perhaps
more realistically,  we now  introduce  the possibility  of  a  severance  scheme and  modify our
expression for the value of restructuring  Let the workers who are likely to lose their job  as a
result of restructuring be offered a share of future profits, m. The payment scheme is summarized
as follows;
7  V2- (1-y)/y.m/r
l-7  Vu + m/r
The value of restructuring will be the same as before, since
VR  =Y(V2---)  +  (O-7Y)(V  +  m)  =  Y V2 +  (1-7)VK y  r  r
The severance value m/r can be determined from the condition;
V  +m  V
r
which means that losers must not be worse off than before restructuring.
7We can also consider a more general case in which that share, (y), of workers dominates
the  others  and  can  force  the  latter  to  follow  their  restructuring  decision.  In  this  case,
compensation can be smaller;
m 
-=  X(V  -V.) r
where 0  S  X  ￿1.
Finally, in the case that the share of the labour force that stands to lose from restructuring,
(1- y), constitutes the majority and has some bargaining power, they will be able to extract a
larget part of future profit and the increase in value due to restructuring (V 2 - V,) will be shared
between these two parts according to their bargaining power 3.
4. Dynamics with taxation
Having laid out the conditions under which restructuring can occur, we now move to the
dynamics. Here we explicitly consider a significant part of unemployment benefits are financed
(or analogously, the subsidies required to keep unemployment low) through payroll taxes. What
we now try and capture is the effect of different values of payroll taxes in the state and private
sectors and the influence this exerts on the dynamics of unemployment.
Reminding ourselves of the basic arbitrage equations,
rV,i  = WI  + PIU  (V.  - VI) + P12 (V 2 - VI) + V]  (1) Value of being in the state sector
rJ2  =  w 2 + P  (V.  - V2) + V2 (2) Value of being in the private sector
rV,, = b + (H I  U)(V 2 - Vu) + V  (3) Value of being unemployed.
Collecting together all the dynamic equations, we get the following expressions for our dynamic
model of restructuring;
I = -(PIu  +PI2)N,
dt
d=Up,  N  - H(U) +  ±  N2 dtPl 
3 See Commander and Naude (1995)
8dN'  = H(U) +p 1 2N  -PN  N2
where;
p = probability  of closure  of state firm;  PR = probability  of restructuring;  13  =  probability  of job
loss in the private  sector;  HIU= probability  of hiring.
Summing  up the balance  equations  we get the consistency  condition;
dN1 +  I2  +dU  =  H  H  N}= {{(,UPi2ul}  'Ul2  3 N2}+{P]uN,i  UPN 
dt  dt  dt  +P12)NI}+{ 7U+ P 2N  N
since  N1+N2+U=I.
A We consider probabilities  p and PR as exogenous  and given  . We assume different values of
payroll  taxes for the state (t) and private sector (t2) and introduce  the parameter,  s= t2/ t, where
t,=t  and t2=st.  We will assume that taxes in private sector are smaller than taxes in the state
sector, i.e. s  < 1. Finally, we assume that only a part of unemployment,  U-°  , is financed
through  payroll  taxes. With these assumptions  we have;
w2 =b +  c(r + B + H/  U)
,=  b(U-U 0 )
NJ (1  - c) + e(1  - U)
H = a(MP2 - w 2(H, U) - E t(U))
where,
w2= wage in the private sector; b= unemployment  benefits;  t, - t  taxes per worker in the state
sector; t2  - Et - taxes per worker in the private sector and a = a matching  term relating the
sensitivity  of the hiring rate to the private sector's performance.
From  these equations  we can find H as a function  of U;
aH  )  [MP2  -b-c(r  +  )-E  b(U-U 0 )/(N 1 (I-s)  +6(1-U))]
aC+U
Substituting  this function into the balance equations  we get the following system of dynamic
equations;
4This  is substantially  different  from Aghion  and Blanchard  (1994) who assume  that;
-N,  =  s = (Pl 1 + P, 2 )N,  = const, where  s=speed  of  restructuring,  with  the  probability  of contraction  of the
state sector  --  PIu+P,2=P+PR=S/Nl  --  increasing  with the overall  contraction  of the state sector  (NI  -e  0).
9dt=  pjuNj - H(U) +Pe(1-  U-N,  )
dt
dN'  = -(PIu  + PI 2 )N, dt
We first start by assuming  that the private sector does not pay any taxes so that in the
extremum,  e=O. For the present,  we assume  that the probability  of restructuring  is constant and
that there is only outflow from the state sector into unemployment,  viz, /J=O  5.  In this case the
dynamic  picture  will be clear.  It is determined  by the equation;
dU = PIU  N  -e(P+PR)t  - a(MP 2 - b - cr)  u








Unemployment  will increase  driven  by the outflow  from the state sector until it reaches the point
(UJd  at which  the H(TJ)  curve crosses  the straight  linep,uNV(t)  which  is dropping  from above  due
to the contraction  of the state sector (Figure 1). Unemployment  will then decline  until it takes a
zero value which  means  that all  the labour  force is in the private sector (Figure  2).
S Note if we set c=1,  ,B=0,  PIU+P)2mP+PR=S/N),  Plu =s(1-01/VN,  then we  would  get pretty  much a similar  set-up  to
Aghion and Blanchard  (1994).
10,  sU
uct
Taking f?  (the probability of job-loss in the private sector) into account will change the final zero
value of unemployment for some finite value. If pluNi(t)  is a slowly changing function of time,
then U. will be a quasi-equilibrium value, slowly decreasing in time.
4.1 Speed of restructuring and exogenous closure
Now  rejecting the assumption that the probability of closure of a state firm is constant
during the restructuring process, we consider two values for the probability of closure -- p,  , the
probability at the start of the restructuring process and P2, the probability that emerges as discrete
policy changes, such as the implementation of a bankruptcy law and the switch to a hard budget
constraint.  It seems reasonable to assume that in general, pi  <  pc  < p2.  We can also assume that
the probability of restructuring, PR, is not  constant  and depends  on whether the condition  of
restructuring, VR> VI or p > pc . In particular, if p  < pc then PR = 0.  Accordingly, at the start of
transition p = pi  and PR  0. The system of dynamic equations will now take the form,
dU  = pAN, -H(U)+,B(1-U-N,)
dt
"I  =  pl NI
dt
dNt  =-H(U)-13N 2
where
H aU[MP2 -1, -c(r  +±,) - eb(U  - U')  / (N 1(1-  E)  + e(I - U))]
Hac+U
We now provide several numerical simulations. In the first scenario, p1 < Pc.  Since  pi  is
small, N,  is a slowly changing variable (almost constant), and this makes the speed of adjustment
11very slow.  If Hmo..  (UJ)  < p,N,, then it will obviously take considerable time for unemployment to
achieve its quasi-equilibrium maximum  value (Figure 3).
If, through policy, the probability of closure switches so that, pi  < p,forp 2 > p,  we get,
dU
d  = (p2 + PR (1- y ))NI  - H(U)  +  D)  (1  - U - N,)
dt
"I  = -(P2 + PR )N1
dt
d  = H(U)  - f  N2
There will be  an obvious increase in unemployment but  the main result will be  an accelerated
speed of adjustment and the quicker attainment of equilibrium (see Figure 4).
We now consider the consequences of varying the tax ratio (E).  Given the unemployment
financing  constraint  and  the  role  of  payroll taxation  in  that  financing, we  can  immediately
understand that the extent of tax compliance by the private sector will have clear repercussions for
not  only  its  own growth  path  but  also on  the  rate  of  decline of the  state  sector. Low  tax
compliance by the private sector can stimulate its own rate of growth, while raising the effective
tax burden on the state sector. We use two extreme values -- E =  0.1 and E = 1 -- and present two
scenarios; the first has a small rate of closure and no restructuring under both tax regimes; the
second has a far higher probability of closure and restructuring.
In the first case -- Figure 5 -- we can see that  the state sector declines very gradually
indeed. Unemployment peaks at around 30 percent but is quite persistent. The private sector's
growth is quite protracted  in both cases. What is clear is that at low probabilities of closure or
restructuring  the tax ratio does not  matter very much. Indeed, with the private  sector largely
outside of the tax net, the main result is for the private sector to grow slightly more rapidly and
consequently for a more rapid elimination of unemployment and completion of the transition. This
weak tax effect can obviously be traced to the low level of unemployment generated under these
probabilities with its associated impact on the financing side.
The second case -- Figure 6 -- has higher probabilities of closure and restructuring. These
raise the unemployment peak very substantially. Further, that peak is quite rapidly attained. The
main factor driving this process is the decline of the state sector. The decline is particularly rapid
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suopalnuns  18aLuatunuio  Sllnsa2when the private sector is effectively  untaxed.  When there is equality in taxation  across sectors,
we find not only that unemployment  peaks nearly ten percentages  points higher but that it is
notably longer  lasting. This can largely  be traced  to the effect that the equal tax incidence  has on
the rate of increase  of the private sector. Relative  to the case with s=O.  1, the private sector grows
less quickly  and the overall  pace of the transition  is slower.  These respective paths will also be
sensitive  to the values of being in private employment  relative to unemployment  ,v 2 > VR.  If
that mark-up  is significant  then we will observe  a quite powerful  effect on unemployment,  whose
level will be unambiguously  higher.
4.2 Analysis  of stability  conditions  and scenarios
In order  to analyse  which  values for the parameters  in our set-up give  stable outcomes  for
restructuring  and which  result in unstable  outcomes,  we take a standard  phase  space approach.
Consequently,  we now  transform  the initial system of equations;
dA  -(Plu  +p,2 )NI
dU =  PINI -a[MP2-  b -cr - cb(U -U)  (NI(I  6) + E(IU))]
dt  atc+U
to the form
dx _  =  _kx
dz  (z-XX)p+(l+9)x-z)
(ac-x+  z)(l(  +  (  1  - x -
16and we introduce  several  new notations:
Tc  = a (d +b)t;  time scale
d = MP 2 - b - cr;  the departure  from competitive  wage setting  in the private sector
(excluding  taxes)
X(Tr)  =  n N, (T);  scaled state employment
-=  P+ PR  inverse  of rate of decay of state employment
a  (d+b)'
and transform  the variables  in order to eliminate  an additive  term in the unemployment  equation
so as to get a multiplicative  representation  on the right hand side of unemployment  equation for
the stability  analysis.
Z(T')  =  U(r ) + r N, (T) is a new variable  which asymptotically  converges  to unemployment  in a
period of time greater  than 1/X  . We introduce  parameters  for simplifying  the equations
d +bU0'
S.  =  d,b ^;asymptotic  critical  value for unemployment
-q  =  Pu  - 1  relative  rate of flow to unemployment  from the state  sector
Piu  +P 12 l+P 12 /PIU
p= =  --  auxiliary  parameter.
d+b  crl
From the equations of motion for the transformed  variables  we directly get an equation for the
trajectories
dz  1  (z-xXjL+(l+p)x-z)
x(ac-xz  4+  (1+  1+-)x-
Due  to the simple  form of this equation  we can draw  characteristic  trajectories  in the phase  plane
17zT  * I~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Figure 7
The  shaded  area  in  the  figure  shows  the  range  of  values  which  z  and  x  can  take
(x<z<I+x,  O<x  <r).  We get them from the conditions (O<U<1,  and  O<N,  <1).  We
have two stable and one unstable point in this figure, of which: (x=O, z=O) is the stable point
which  corresponds to  a  successful outcome  of the restructuring  process (N1(o)=O,  U(ox)=O);
(x=O, z=jL) is an  unstable point which  leads to  the collapse  of the private  sector  (N2(oo)=0,
U(oo) =1).
If we are interested in the values of parameters for which we have stable outcomes for
restructuring, we need to find the separatrice line  zj(x).  For this purpose we need to solve the
differential equation for z(x) in the vicinity of the unstable point, (x=O,  z=,u). Since the slope of
function z(x) at the steady point is;
dz  O
dx  O
We use l'Hopital's  rule for this indeterminate form and application yields;
dz I  1  dZ  )
dx  =gx  k(axc  +  l-  dx  =F
Introducing a new parameter, characterizing the slope of the separatrice line,
18p  (aX  c +St)1-)
we find a solution to the linear equation with respect to the slope of the separatrice line at the
steady state;
dz  I  pp(l+9)
dx  x=R  1 + pL
We can use this  value  as the  initial slope  and  compute  the whole  function  determining the
separatrice line analytically as a series on powers of deviations from the steady point (x-jL)  or
using standard numerical methods.
The analytical approach gives us -- in quadratic approximation -- the following function;
Z(x)  =  (l+  p  (l+  )x+  p  2(i  +  p)  X2  +o(  3 ))
I + py  (I  +pSt)  (2 +p~L)
Having obtained  this  we  can write the  condition  for  a  stable  outcome  for  the restructuring
process;
U° +  il AO < z,  N,°
In the linear approximation it gives us a constraint on the value of E (the ratio of private and state
pay-roll taxes);
1
E  l (d +  b)(U° - )(1  + pt ) +qN '
l+
dippT N,
or a constraint on the values of the probabilities of closure and restructuring when the tax ratio E
is fixed.
From this  constraint, which is approximate, we can see that for a wide range of other
parameters there exists  a  critical  value of  E  ,  exceeding which  leads to  the collapse  of the
restructuring process. To analyse this question more quantitatively we consider the results  of
some numerical simulations. These results are shown in two figures with a separatrice line and an
initial point (the position of which relative to the separatrice line (up or under) determines the
stability of the trajectories) and the plot of three variables; unemployment (U), state employment
(Nd and private employment (N2, for different values of the parameters.
19Figures 8 and 9 now give the results for small values of the probabilities of restructuring
and closure with a small ratio of private and state taxes  =  t2ltl.
Figure  8: Values:  p=0.02, PR=O, £=O.1
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We can immediately see that a larger distance from the initial point to  the separatrice line in
Figure 9 indicates that there will be a greater sensitivity of the solution to the change in initial
conditions and hence the outcome with tax equivalence (=  1) appears significantly less stable.
Figure 9: Values: p=0.02, PR=O,  E=1
Numerical  Simulations  Z  Separatrice  line
l - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _1.2  ._-_:_,,_  ._  :






0.2  -1  1iF  1  1  F  #  2 
0.2
0 
OC  _  I'  0  C  Ct  °  time  0  0.5  1  1.5  2X
We now raise the probabilities of closure and restructuring, under the two tax ratios and get;
20Figure 10: Values:  p= 0.05 , PR= 0 -05 F=0.1
Numerical  Simulations  Z  Separatrice line
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Figure 11: Values:  p=0.05,  PR=0 0 5, e=1
Numerical Simulations  Z  Separatrice  line
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We can see from  the  figures  that  though  the maximum  value  for  unemployment  is higher  than  it
was with  smaller  probabilities  of closure  and restructuring,  the overall  adjustment  time  is lower.
Finally,  it is also  interesting  to  trace  the  influence  of the  matching  process  in the  labour
market  which  we  have  described  by  parameter  ax, measuring  the  sensitivity  of hiring  rate  to  the
private  sector's  performance,  as measured  by the  mark-up  of marginal  product  over the  wage.  If
we  decrease  significantly  the  value  of this  parameter  we  get quite  a different  picture.  There  will
exist  some  critical  value  of c such that the  initial  point  in the phase  space  lies on  the  separatrice
and we have  large  and long  lasting  unemployment.
21Figure 12:
Numerical Simulations  Z  Separatrice  line
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If we increase the value of s even very slightly we get a collapse of the private sector. We get the
same situation (and behaviour with respect to E) as for small values of a,  if we increase the value
of unemployment benefits b, as shown below for e > sy.
Figure  13:
Numerical Simulations  Z  Separatrice line
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From the above, we can see that the outcome of restructuring process becomes very sensitive to
the tax ratio between the state and private sector and leads to  instability when the value of  E
exceeds some critical value.
We can see from the analysis above that the tax ratio E  =  t2/tl  plays  a critical role in
explaining the path of restructuring.  A low effective tax rate confronting the private sector has
the  clear  effect  of  increasing  the  private  sector's  hiring  rate,  hence  helping  to  absorb
unemployment and accelerate the restructuring process. Analogously, a low tax rate facing the
private  sector imposes  an  additional  tax burden  on  the  state  sector,  in  part  because  of the
22necessity  of  financing  unemployment  benefits.  Raising  the  tax  burden  on  the  state  sector
stimulates  the  outflow  from  the  state  sector  and  raises  the  probabilities  of  closure  and
restructuring in the state sector.
We can analyse this  feedback  channel by  explicitly  endogenizing the  probabilities  of
closure and restructuring and assume that they depend on the change in the value of remaining in
a state firm. This will be done in the subsequent paper.
Conclusion
Our paper has been primarily concerned with the dynamics of transition where our focus
has been on restructuring choices. Having  set up the conditions under which restructuring can
occur, we then proceed to the dynamnics.  We look initially at the implications of various speeds of
restructuring,  introducing  two  probabilities  of  closure  and  a  restructuring  probability.  We
identify a critical value for restructuring. When the closure probability is small, as at the outset of
transition, and below the critical value, we find that unemployment will peak lower than with a
higher closure probability but that the overall speed of transition will be much slower. Focusing
on the effect of different tax incidence across state and private sectors, our numerical simulations
similarly show that widespread tax avoidance by the private sector can stimulate that sector's
growth and result in a faster overall speed of transition. In this regard, one of the findings of the
paper is that while a low tax burden on the private sector can drive unemployment up rapidly,
through raising the probability of closure for the state sector, it can also assist in achieving a
faster transition  by  provoking  a  more rapid private  sector response.  Finally,  we  look  at the
stability properties.
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